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I. GLOBALIZATION AND THE NEW LEX MERCATORIA 
 
  
The globalization and internationalization of the economy1 entail a need for 
unified laws.2 In a globalized market, the interactions between businesses and 
people from different states require that international trade be governed by 
uniform rules. This unification of legal systems is achieved in a variety of ways.  
One method is the process of conventional uniformization, which recognizes 
the preeminent role of the state, albeit in a relationship of interstate cooperation. 
 
 
* Ph.D. in Italian and European Constitutional Law and Researcher at the Institute for the Study of 
Regionalism and Self Government (“ISSiRFA”) of the National Research Council (“CNR”) in Rome.  
Email address: gabriella.saputelli@cnr.it. 
1 On the history of globalization, see JÜRGEN OSTERHAMMEL & NIELS P. PETERSSON, 
GLOBALIZATION: A SHORT HISTORY, (Dona Geyer trans., 2009).There is a vast literature on 
globalization. See, e.g., ULRICH BECK, CHE COS’È LA GLOBALIZZAZIONE: RISCHI E PROSPETTIVE DELLA 
SOCIETÀ PLANETARIA (1999); IAN CLARK, GLOBALIZATION AND FRAGMENTATION: INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1997) (discussing the history and impact of globalization); 
ANTHONY GIDDENS, EUROPE IN THE GLOBAL AGE (2006); DAVID HELD, GOVERNARE LA 
GLOBALIZZAZIONE: UN’ALTERNATIVA DEMOCRATICA AL MONDO UNIPOLARE (2005); AMARTYA K. 
SEN, GLOBALIZZAZIONE E LIBERTÀ (G. Bono trans., 2003); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND 
ITS DISCONTENTS (2002); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZZAZIONE (2011); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, MAKING 
GLOBALIZATION WORK (2006); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ ET AL., THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE STATE (Arnold 
Heertje ed., 1989).  
2 See for example, SABINO CASSESE, LO SPAZIO GIURIDICO GLOBALE (2003); MARCO D’ALBERTI, 
POTERI PUBBLICI, MERCATI E GLOBALIZZAZIONE (2008); YVES DEZALAY, I MERCANTI DEL DIRITTO 
(1997); NATALINO IRTI, L’ORDINE GIURIDICO DEL MERCATO (1998); FRANCESCO GALGANO & FABRIZIO 
MARRELLA, DIRITTO E PRASSI DEL COMMERCIO INTERNAZIONALE (2010); FRANCESCO GALGANO, LA 
GLOBALIZZAZIONE NELLO SPECCHIO DEL DIRITTO (2005); MARIA ROSARIA FERRARESE, DIRITTO 
SCONFINATO: INVENTIVA GIURIDICA E SPAZI NEL MONDO GLOBALE (2006) [hereinafter FERRARESE, 
DIRRITO SCONFINATO]; MARIA ROSARIA FERRARESE, LE ISTITUZIONI DELLA GLOBALIZZAZIONE: 
DIRITTO E DIRITTI NELLA SOCIETÀ TRANSNAZIONALE (2000) [hereinafter FERRARESE, LE ISTITUZIONI], 
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Indeed, since states cannot regulate market globalization individually,3 they 
delegate or transfer the production of laws to supranational entities.4  
The rise of economic globalization has also encouraged forms of 
spontaneous uniformization via self-regulation, whereby rules are often drawn 
up directly by private entities involved in international trade, such as large 
corporations, law firms, and banks––sometimes including “contractual customs 
having international value”––which have their own dispute settlement 
mechanisms consisting mainly of arbitrators, but with whom national judges 
also interact.5 These rules are obviously “transnational,”6 and significantly affect 
the sources of law by challenging states’ monopoly on the production of laws 
and threatening the hierarchy of legal sources.  
The new lex mercatoria is a synthetic expression that refers to this 
spontaneous production of law in the global market; it was first used during the 
1960s in scientific circles, and eventually became commonly used, despite the 
lack of a univocal definition.7 According to famous Italian legal scholar 
Francesco Galgano, the expression new lex mercatoria concerns the law created 
by the business community without the mediation of the legislative powers of 
states; it comprises rules that regulate the commercial relations that are 
established within the economic sphere of the markets in a uniform manner 
beyond the political units of states.8 
 
 
3 Until a few years ago the expression “crisis of the State” was commonly used. See, e.g., SABINO 
CASSESE, LA CRISI DELLO STATO (2002); Sabino Cassese, L’erosione dello Stato: Una Vicenda 
Irreversibile?, in DALLO STATO MONOCLASSE ALLA GLOBALIZZAZIONE 15 (Sabino Cassese & Giuseppe 
Guarino eds., 2000); SABINO CASSESE, OLTRE LO STATO (2nd ed. 2006). 
4 GALGANO & MARRELLA, supra note 2, at 42 (examining the institutions that work in the area of 
international and transnational commerce).  
5 See MICHAEL J. BONELL, LE REGOLE OGGETTIVE DEL COMMERCIO INTERNAZIONALE 3–20 (1976) 
(discussing law-making by economic actors interested in international commerce); FABRIZIO MARRELLA, 
LA NUOVA LEX MERCATORIA, PRINCIPI UNIDROIT ED USI DEI CONTRATTI DEL COMMERCIO 
INTERNAZIONALE 261 (2003) (discussing this distinction); René David, Il Diritto del Commercio 
Internazionale: Un Nuovo Compito per i Legislatori Nazionali o una Nuova Lex Mercatoria?, 22 RIVISTA 
DI DIRITTO CIVILE 577 (1976) (comparing the two ways of unifying the law). 
6 FERRARESE, DIRITTO SCONFINATO, supra note 2, at 34, 65 (defining transnational measures); 
FERRARESE, LE ISTITUZIONI, supra note 2, at 106 (discussing the difference between international and 
transnational). 
7 The two paradigmatic theses about the lex mercatoria are ascribable to Bertold Goldman and Clive 
Schmitthoff, who are considered the founding fathers of the modern concept of the lex marcatoria. 
Besides being instrumental in the revival of lex mercatoria speech, their reconstructions have played a 
very important role in the subsequent academic elaboration of international trade law and arbitration. See 
Berthold Goldman, Lex Mercatoria, 3 FORUM INTERNATIONALE 3, 3–7 (1983); Clive Schmitthoff, The 
Unification of the Law of International Trade, J. BUS. L. 105, 105–09 (1968). 
For an examination of the two theories, also identified with the two main approaches followed by the 
doctrine, see Nikitas E. Hatzimihail, The Many Lives—and Faces—of Lex Mercatoria: History as 
Genealogy in International Business Law, 71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169 (Summer 2008). See also LEX 
MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 1998) (discussing the origins and 
development of the theory of lex mercatoria in the literature, legislation, international conventions, and 
jurisprudence); FILIP DE LY, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW AND LEX MERCATORIA 207 (1992); 
ANTOINE KASSIS, THÉORIE GÉNÉRALE DES USAGES DU COMMERCE: DROIT COMPARÉ, CONTRATS ET 
ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAUX, LEX MERCATORIA (1984); FILALI OSMAN, LES PRINCIPES GÈNÉRAUX 
DE LA LEX MERCATORIA: CONTRIBUTION À L’ÉTUDE D’UN ORDRE JURIDICQUE ANATIONAL (1992); 
LEX MERCATORIA: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW IN HONOUR OF FRANCIS 
REYNOLDS (Francis D. Rose ed., 2000). 
8 See FRANCESCO GALGANO, LEX MERCATORIA: STORIA DEL D IRITTO COMMERCIALE 219 (1993); 
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In spite of the different evaluations of the sources of the lex mercatoria—
which reflect the different ways in which it is perceived—the most commonly 
used reconstructions identify the following elements within the lex mercatoria9: 
(1) usage and practices of international trade; (2) uniform contractual models; 
(3) arbitration case law; and (4) general principles. The modalities whereby the 
lex mercatoria is formed evoke the characteristics of customary sources and 
raise questions about its role in contemporary State orders, specifically in trade 
relations, and with respect to their efficacy within the State.10 
The terminology immediately evokes a comparison with the ancient 
(medieval) lex mercatoria,11 even though more accepted literature considers 
such comparisons as possibly misleading in light of the contextual changes in 
the components of the lex mercatoria since medieval times.12 For example, the 
 
 
9 For an analysis of the sources of law of international trade law, specifically lex mercatoria, see JAN 
DALHUISEN, DALHUISEN ON TRANSNATIONAL COMPARATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL AND TRADE 
LAW: INTRODUCTION–THE NEW LEX MERCATORIA AND ITS SOURCES 137, 281 (4th ed. 2010); DE LY, 
supra note 7, at 207–316 (giving analysis of the sources of law of international trade, specifically lex 
mercatoria);  GALGANO, supra note 2, at 58–59; MARRELLA, supra note 5; Michael J. Bonell, Lex 
Mercatoria, 9 DIGESTO DELLE DISCIPLINE PRIVATISTICHE: SEZIONE DIRITTO COMMERCIALE 11 (1993). 
10 See CUSTOMARY LAW AND ECONOMICS (Lisa Bernstein & Francesco Parisi eds., 2014); J. H. 
Dalhuisen, Custom and its Revival in Transnational Private Law, 18 DUKE J.  COMP. & INT’L L. 339 
(2008). 
11 The "lex mercatoria" (or law merchant) is an expression to indicate the law created by the merchant 
community in the late Middle Ages in order to integrate (or overcome) the application of the various local 
legal systems, which became inadequate as trade grew and developed. See W.A. BEWES, THE ROMANCE 
OF THE LAW MERCHANT: BEING AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL AND 
COMMERCIAL LAW WITH SOME ACCOUNT OF THE COMMERCE AND FAIRS OF THE MIDDLE AGES 8–9 
(1998).  
The first important book on the theme, entitled “Consuetudo, vel, Lex Mercatoria, or, the Ancient 
Law Merchant,” was published in 1622 by an English merchant, Gerard Malynes, who wrote in the 
introduction: “I have entitled the book according to the ancient name of Lex mercatoria, and not jus 
mercatorum because it is a customary Law, approved by the Authority of all Kingdoms and 
Commonwealths, and not a Law established by the Sovereignty of any Prince, either in the first 
foundation, or in the continuance of time”. This corpus of laws is subject to numerous studies and 
criticisms. See, e.g., DE LY, supra note 7, at 15–21; LEON E. TRAKMAN, THE LAW MERCHANT: THE 
EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL LAW (1983); FROM LEX MERCATORIA TO COMMERCIAL LAW 53 (Vito 
Piergiovanni ed., 2005).  
On the traditional theory of the medieval lex mercatoria, see HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND 
REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 333–56 (1983); WILLIAM MITCHELL, 
ESSAY ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE LAW MERCHANT (1904); Bruce L. Benson, The Spontaneous 
Evolution of Commercial Law, 55 S. ECON. J. 644 (1989); Francis M. Burdick, What Is the Law 
Merchant?, 2 COLUM. L. REV. 470 (1902).  
The idea of a universal merchant law (produced, interpreted, and applied autonomously by the 
merchant class) has been included in many commercial law studies and has profoundly influenced the 
development of commercial law in the modern era. For a criticism of such theses, see Charles Donahue 
Jr., Benvenuto Stracca’s De Mercatura: Was there a Lex Mercatoria in Sixteenth-Century Italy, in FROM 
LEX MERCATORIA TO COMMERIAL LAW 70 (Vito Piergiovanni ed., 2005); Charles Donahue, Jr., 
Medieval and Early Modern Lex Mercatoria: An Attempt at the Probatio Diabolica, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 
21, 35–36 (2004); Emily Kadens, Order Within Law, Variety Within Custom: The Character of the 
Medieval Merchant Law, 5 CHI. J.  INT’L L. 39, 56 (2004) [hereinafter Kadens, Order Within Law]; Emily 
Kadens, The Myth of the Customary Law Merchant, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1153, 1160 (2012) [hereinafter 
Kadens, Myth Customary Law Merchant]; Stephen E. Sachs, From St. Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern 
Distortion of the Medieval ‘Law Merchant,’ 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 685, 690 (2006).  
Some other historical reconstructions show that the role of local institutions and “authoritarian” law 
has been far from irrelevant or secondary in regulating trade. See Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North & 
Barry R. Weingast, The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, 
and the Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1 (1990). 
12 See generally Adaora Okwor, Lex Mercatoria as Transnational Commercial Law: Is the Lex 
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ancient lex mercatoria preceded the advent of modern states, while the current 
lex mercatoria operates within a world characterized by the dominance of 
states,13 with the function of going beyond fragmentation due to the political 
division of markets.14  
Several authors point out that a distorted use is made of the medieval 
experience to legitimize modern aspirations to govern transnational trade 
autonomously and independently of any state conditioning:15 in this context the 
terminology and comparison with the medieval  lex mercatoria would legitimize 
the deregulation of the markets,16 and replace the state regulation of international 
trade with transnational customary law.17 What matters, therefore, is not what 
happened historically, but “what projections into the past align best with present 
circumstances and what constructions of the past are used to justify explanations 
of the present.”18  
The crux of the issue, both in terms of the ancient and the new lex 
mercatoria, is not its existence, but the reconstruction of its nature and its 
relationship with the “official” system of law19: the criticisms against the 
traditional theses are that the ancient lex mercatoria was not completely 
autonomous of the official law, but was composed of a set of sources, 
procedures, and institutions, among which there was continuous competition and 
interchange.20  
In this regard, the thesis of Michael J. Bonell seems to be quite realistic; he 
states that the economic forces engaged in international trade may have their 
own rules due to the fact that in this area states have largely waived the 
imposition of their legislation, granting individual economic operators wide 
powers of contractual autonomy and attributing effective quasi-legislation to 
 
 
393 (Mads Andenas & Camilla Baasch Andersen eds., 2011) (comparing the new and the old lex 
mercatoria). 
13 See FERRARESE, LE ISTITUZIONI, supra note 2, at 149–50 (describing the differences in the 
economic and legal contexts that undermine a comparison between the “ancient” and the “new” lex 
mercatoria). 
14 See GALGANO, supra note 2, at 57 (emphasizing the fact that the new lex mercatoria affects the 
legal system of the State). 
15 Hatzimihail, supra note 7, at 169; Sachs, supra note 11, at 690 (arguing that the historical 
experience of medieval merchant law has been misunderstood and misused in order to legitimize 
“political ends”).  
16 Scholars of various disciplines have been clinging to the lex mercatoria story for decades as 
indisputable evidence that the private order can work. The use of lex mercatoria in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries would thus have a strong symbolic value to give historic legitimacy to economic and 
political theories about how law is or should be created. See Kadens, Myth Customary Law Merchant, 
supra note 11, at 1153. 
17 For years, historians have sought evidence of the existence of a mercantile legal system independent 
from state systems as a solution to the contemporary problems of international trade. The revival in the 
twentieth century of the lex mercatoria is thus linked to the attempt to conceive a system of this type as 
a solution to the legal problems created by cross-border trade and as replacement of complicated doctrines 
of “conflict of laws.” See Sachs, supra note 11, 688, 808, 811.  
18 Hatzimihail, supra note 7, at 173.  
19 Some scholars consider the lex mercatoria’s legal basis as being anchored to the state system 
(Schmitthoff is one of the supporters of this theory), while others qualify the lex mercatoria as a legal 
system independent of the state and international legal systems (Goldman is one of the supporters of this 
theory). Others consider the debate on the independence of the lex mercatoria to be irrelevant. See 
Goldman, supra note 7; Schmitthoff, supra note 7. See generally  Peter J. Mazzacano, The Lex Mercatoria 
as Autonomous Law, 4 COMP. RES. L. & POL. ECON. 1 (2008).  
20 For a very useful analysis, see Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State, 14 
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uses developed within their respective traffic areas. For this reason, the fate of 
lex mercatoria continues to depend on the smaller or larger space that States 
intend to confer on the power of self-regulation of individuals.21  
 
 




The lex mercatoria has recently raised many doubts, because through this 
system of law, strong parties have imposed rules that are congenial to them, 
skirting around the principles of the rule of law—as they have been conceived 
in civil law systems—which are expressed in specific sources of law. The 
phenomena described present a series of negative effects in themselves22 that do 
not remain confined to the international level, but have significant consequences 
for states, including tax issues regarding cross-border trade transactions and 
multinational companies, and citizens’ rights. 
The recent financial crisis and the severe repercussions it has had on national 
systems—caused primarily by the financial market—has revealed the risks of 
deregulation and the need to recover a “public law dimension”23 aimed at 
establishing private regulation, instead of a “global law without a State.”24 This 
doctrine certainly advocates the reformulation of the hierarchical and vertical 
concepts of normativity in light of horizontal processes and mutual recognition, 
but also argues that fundamental rights and common interests should be taken 
into account, as stated in the principles of liberal-democratic constitutionalism.25  
The demands for a re-evaluation of the public sphere and the reconciliation 
of particular interests with general interests certainly call into play the role of 
states and international organizations, and questions their position regarding the 
production of norms associated with globalization.  
 
 
21 Bonell, supra note 9, at 16. 
22 Many doubts have been raised about the content and nature of lex mercatoria, which could be used 
by private powers to their own advantage. See, e.g., Michael Mustill, The New Lex Mercatoria: The First 
Twenty-Five Years, 4 ARB. INT’L 86 (1988); D’ALBERTI, supra note 2, at 135 n.133 (the lex mercatoria 
is “structurally inclined” to favor big companies and the mercantile logic; i. International trade law clearly 
favours economic interests to the detriment of the public interest, social values, and human rights).  
23 Armin von Bogdandy & Sergio Dellavalle, The Lex Mercatoria of Systems Theory: Localisation, 
Reconstruction and Criticism from a Public Law Perspective, 4 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 59, 70–82 
(2012). 
24 Id. at 74. By reviewing the main theories that historically have proposed the idea of a global order 
formed by private actors, these two scholars demonstrate that private law interactions have always taken 
place in a context of general interest and that the idea of common good has ensured the primacy of the 
rules of public law and institutions in case of conflict. Thus, modern theories differ widely from the 
foregoing, as they argue that a global order can develop solely on the self-regulated transnational activities 
of private actors and independently from public institutions. These theories, for the first time, support the 
idea of a social order without institutional or regulatory reference to a public sphere, a general interest, or 
an idea of common good. One of the most well-known theses, among the attempts to provide theoretical 
support to this idea, has been elaborated by Gunther Teubner using the conceptual premise of system 
theory. See Gunther Teubner, ‘Global Bukowina’: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW 
WITHOUT A STATE 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997) (identifying in the lex mercatoria a legal autopoietic 
system capable of establishing a self-referential and global economic system that would be a Global Law 
Without a State).  
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The proliferation of supranational bodies and authorities having the function 
of governing the global economy26 has, in recent years, stimulated a lively 
debate about global politics and the need to safeguard the rule of law in the 
globalized system (e.g., rights of participation, democracy, fundamental right 
protection).27 It has become commonly recognized that even in a globalized 
context, states may still need to play a significant role in guaranteeing and 
protecting the rule of law, requiring the characteristics of constitutionalism, 
which may be accomplished directly through domestic law or indirectly through 
instruments of international law or forms of supranational associations, such as 
the European Union (EU).28 
The real critical node arising from these considerations is therefore the 
‘attitude’ of the bodies—states and intergovernmental organizations—that are 
the expression of the public dimension toward the lex mercatoria. This attitude 
may be identified by analyzing the sources of law, whereby it is possible to 
understand the effects of the lex mercatoria on states and its relationship with 
state law. Although this analyzation is not a formal question, it is highly 
demonstrative of, and strictly linked to, the rule of law, the democratic system, 
and the protection of rights.  
The lex mercatoria’s influence on the legal orders of states has led other 
experts to maintain that its efficacy is partly the result of the open sovereignty 
of states, and partly depends on its transnational nature, which does not allow 
states to exercise any form of control over it. Some experts’ assertions survive 
scrutiny from economic and sociological standpoints but, from a purely legal or 
constitutional standpoint, such statements require a dogmatic foundation in 
positive law. In a public or constitutional perspective, it is necessary to verify 
the efficacy attributed to this transnational law in states’ constitutional systems 
by analyzing the openness of the new form of the democratic, pluralistic state 
vis-à-vis its various legal sources.29  
The attitude of the European Union and its member states towards the lex 
mercatoria, is discussed in this paper through a public or constitutional law 
approach by analyzing the relationship between sources of law. In this way, it is 
possible to examine its impact on the rule of law, on the guarantee of democracy, 








26 See SABINO CASSESE, CHI GOVERNA IL MONDO? 15 (2013) (analyzing the plurality of 
intergovernmental and non-governmental bodies operating in the supranational context). 
27 Id. These are the studies of ‘global administrative law’ to which many scholars have contributed. 
See Global Administrative Law, INST. FOR INT’L LAW & JUSTICE, http://www.iilj.org/gal/ (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2018).  
28 See Natalino Irti, Le Categorie Giuridiche della Globalizzazione, 48 RIVISTA DI DRITTO CIVILE 
625, 633 (2002) (supporting the fundamental role that states should play in a globalized context).  
29 See GABRIELLA SAPUTELLI, STATO, UNIONE EUROPEA E LEX MERCATORIA (2015); Gabriella 
Saputelli, The Role of Customary Law and the New Lex Mercatoria in Countries with a Civil Law 
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III. STATE AND LEX MERCATORIA: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW  
 
 
A brief historic overview can help to solve these questions by describing 
how the role of customary transnational law has changed as the form of states 
have evolved.30 The choice of a source system, in fact, constitutes a variable that 
depends on the form of the state, as evidenced by the arrangements that sources 
of law have had throughout history in those various forms.31 The form of a state 
in this sense signifies the relationship between authority and freedom and the 
openness to phenomena occurring outside of the state’s borders. 
A historic survey shows that the general legal system has always attempted 
to delimit and reduce the efficacy of spontaneously formed law—that, in most 
cases, has taken on the form of usage and customs. In observing the relationships 
between the main sources of law in some medieval legal systems, various 
attempts to delimit the efficacy of customs, or to establish an overriding role of 
the political sources over it, can be identified. 
With the gradual concentration of the power of imperio [full authority], the 
law has become inseparably tied to the concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty, 
unlike other manifestations of power—such as the executive or judicial 
powers—has been associated mainly with the power of law-making. In the 
sixteenth century, Jean Bodin explained that the sovereign is the supreme 
legislator because he has the power to modify the law and is the ultimate legal 
authority to which all the others are subordinate.32 
At that time, the advent of the state created deep changes in the way social 
groups were organized, which caused a deep fracture in the legal tradition. It 
reduced the efficacy of spontaneous forms of laws—those produced directly by 
the social group through usage and customs—and enhanced the role of political 
sources, which emanate from a political authority. From the assertion of this new 
form of political organization, the degree of closure of the legal order—from the 
standpoint of the production of laws and the relationship between imposed 
sources and sources arising from the social sphere—has become closely related 
to the form of the state that came about in a given historic moment.  
Under the liberal state, at least in Europe, the legal order became self-
sufficient and the political sources of law prevailed over customary law. Ever 
since, the efficacy of customary law within a state cannot be derived from the 
imposition of this phenomenon, irrespective of an evaluation—albeit implicit—
 
 
30 For this historical overview, see generally CARLETON KEMP ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING (4th ed. 
1946); J.H. BAKER, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: LAWYERS, BOOKS AND THE LAW (2000); BERMAN, 
supra note 11; MARIO CARAVALE, ALLE ORIGINI DEL DIRITTO EUROPEO (2005); 2 ADRIANO CAVANNA, 
STORIA DEL DIRITTO MODERNO IN EUROPA (2006); CARLO M. CIPOLLA, STORIA ECONOMICA 
DELL’EUROPA PREINDUSTRIALE (1974); JOHN K.GALBRAITH, STORIA DELL’ECONOMIA (1990); PAOLO 
GROSSI, SOCIETÀ, DIRITTO, STATO: UN RECUPERO PER IL DIRITTO (2006); J.M. KELLY, A SHORT 
HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY 139 (1992); TRAKMAN, supra note 11; Bruce L. Benson, The 
Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law, 55 S. ECON. J. 644 (1989)  
31 See Adolf Merkl, Prolegomeni ad una Teoria della Costruzione a Gradi del Diritto, in IL DUPLICE 
VOLTO DEL DIRITTO: IL SISTEMA KELSENIANO E ALTRI SAGGI 8 (C. Geraci ed., 1987) (stating that the 
form of the state is fundamental for the system of sources of law, because some peculiar sources of law 
are linked to some forms of State).  
32 Jean Bodin was one of the most important proponents of the theory of sovereignty in the sixteenth 
century. In his famous book, Les Six Livres de la Republique, originally published in 1583, he explained 
that it is in the nature of every independent State to have supreme legislative powers. See generally JEAN 
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of the phenomenon by the state. This new form of political organization had 
some unique characteristics that set it apart from other legal orders, such as 
exclusiveness and impenetrability, which materialized in a state monopoly of 
law-making and was representative of one of the main features of sovereignty. 
In Europe, this process coincided with the codifying experiences, between 
the end of the fifteenth and first-half of the eighteenth centuries, which led to the 
drafting of official customary law texts. Additionally, statutes issued by 
representatives in Parliaments delimited the efficacy of customary law, 
downgrading it to the status of a residual source of law. 
Common law systems, referred to often as a paradigm of legal orders in 
which primary importance is attached to customary law, were no exception to 
this evolution. A closer analysis reveals that the efficacy of usage and practices 
undergo a conditioning that is similar to what occurs in civil law systems, as a 
result of the importance initially taken on by case law and, in more recent times, 
statutory law. 
These outcomes are confirmed by other studies that furnish proof of 
continuity in the history of the public regulation of the economy—albeit with 
different modalities, instruments and intensity of regulation—and show that not 
even contemporary times are characterized by the end or the decline of the action 
of public authorities in the discipline of the economy.33 
 
 
IV. THE CONTEMPORARY STATE AND THE LEX MERCATORIA 
 
 
In the Italian system, there are no provisions that explicitly and formally 
authorize the lex mercatoria to produce effects within it; however, a series of 
elements allow for an indirect and implicit opening to it. As stated earlier, the 
sources of the new lex mercatoria correspond to some modalities of law making 
which are recognized by the legal systems of various states. These circumstances 
allow the lex mercatoria, even without the explicit acknowledgment by a state, 
to produce effects within the domestic order through the space reserved for 
customary law and private autonomy. In these cases, the lex mercatoria can 
never contradict the legislative order because of the hierarchical position of the 
sources of law which opens the door to transnational law.  
The specific structure of the pluralist-democratic state, which is an evolution 
of the liberal state, commands new reflections. Specifically, its opening to 
international law may have a direct impact on its system of sources of law and 
may partially change the approaches inherited from the structure of the liberal 
state. An example is the new wording of Article 117, Paragraph 1 of the Italian 
Constitution, which proposes that the domestic sources of law are subordinate 
to “the constraints deriving from EU legislation and international obligations,”34 
resulting in different consequences and control modalities. Under this Article, 
any opening towards the lex mercatoria by the EU and international sources of 
 
 
33 See, e.g., D’ALBERTI, supra note 2, at 141 (giving a description of the characteristics of public 
regulation in contemporary times and an excursus of the transformations that have occurred throughout 
history).  
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law, particularly international agreements, may lead to such law merging with 
Italy’s domestic law.  
Clauses of this type could enable custom-formed, spontaneous law to make 
its way into national law through international and European sources. A practical 
effect of this merging is that the customs of international trade, which represent 
a considerable portion of the lex mercatoria, acquire weight and authority that 
do not correspond to the ranking of customs in the domestic hierarchical system 
of law. The incorporation mechanism is always usage and practice secundum 
legem [according to the law] that springs into motion when a source refers to 
customs for the integration of its content.35 According to the most common 
reconstruction, through this mechanism, custom will take on the same regulatory 
force and position in the hierarchical scale as the sources that cite it—deriving 
its authority purely from cross-referencing.36  
The efficacy of transnational usage and practices is due to the prevalence of 
EU and international law over the system of domestic sources, which may lead 
to the overcoming of an explicit prohibition contained in a state or regional 
statute. This effect could pass through provisions of European ‘private’ law and 
European private international law, or EU trade agreements,37 especially 
considering that the EU has an exclusive competence in trade matters.38  
The peculiarities of the pluralist democratic state allow for interaction 
between different regulatory processes (official and spontaneous), and an 
interchange of rules functional with the demands that come from trade relations, 
thus making the legal system amenable to those needs.39 At the same time, the 
pluralist democratic state has instruments to control and ensure the protection of 
rights and intertwining of interests—factors which are considered to be 
distinctive features of constitutionalism. Reference is being made here to the 
control over public order implemented by every judge, and to the control of 
constitutionality enforced by constitutional courts. 
As a limitation to the prevalence of international and European law, the 
Italian and German Constitutional Courts have provided the counter-limits 




35 See Alessandro Pizzorusso, Fonti (sistema costituzionale delle), in 6 DIGESTO DISCIPLINE 
PUBBLICISTICHE 429 (1991).  
36 ALFREDO ROCCO, PRINCIPII DI DIRITTO COMMERCIALE: PARTE GENERALE 137 (1928). 
37 See, e.g., Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, EU-CA, Oct. 28, 2016, O.J. (L 11) 60; 
Resolution 2014/2228 of the European Parliament of 8 July 2015 containing the European Parliament’s 
recommendations to the European Commission on the negotiations for 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), 2017 O.J. (C 265) 5. 
38 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 3, Oct. 26, 2012, 
2012 O.J. (C 326) 51 [hereinafter TFEU]. Considered as one of the most important sectors of the European 
Union, the common commercial policy has been characterized from the beginning as an exclusive 
competence of the Community, although its wide scope and evolution have raised issues of competence 
between States and Community.   
39 Alec Stone Sweet, The New Lex Mercatoria and Transnational Governance, 13 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 
627, 627 (Aug. 2006) (stating that “[n]ational legal systems have adapted to the Lex Mercatoria, thereby 
enhancing the latter’s autonomy, and the EU has begun to move in the same direction.”).  
40 See Stelio Mangiameli, Unchangeable Core Elements of National Constitutions and the Process 
of European Integration. For a Criticism of the Theory of the “Controlimiti” (Counter-limits /Schranken-
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The use of the counter-limits doctrine to prevent the efficacy of European 
and international law is often considered a remote hypothesis, but some recent 
constitutional court judgments demonstrate that this control can always be 
activated. For example, we can mention for Germany: the Lissabon Urteil case 
of 2009,41 and the 2010 Mangold case concerning EU law,42 and for Italy: the 
2014 case of the Italian Constitutional Court in which the Court prevented an 
international custom from entering into the domestic order through the above-
mentioned constitutional provisions.43 
The control claimed by these Constitutional Courts over European law and 
international customary law demonstrate that it is always the state that allows or 
rejects the efficacy of laws produced by external sources of law in domestic legal 
systems. The breadth of this control will of course depend on developments in 
international and European law.  
Therefore, it can be stated that the inclusion of constitutional provisions that 
allow the opening of the domestic order does not imply a retreat of the state in 
the exercise of sovereign functions but, on the contrary, it presupposes them.44 
The approach described considers the judge—namely the person who 
interprets national law and confirms the efficacy of the phenomena that produces 
transnational rules—as main guarantor of the rule of law and reflects the role 
that judges are increasingly playing in the contemporary system. By carrying out 
this function, the judge may also use many instruments provided by the 
internationalization or Europeanization of fundamental rights that arguably 
offset the loss of sovereignty that commonly follows globalization. This 
approach tends to bring the continental system closer to the common law system, 
but it is not sufficient in civil law systems, where remedies require an evaluation 
by representative bodies as they cannot be left solely in the hands of the judges.  
However, it is almost evident that in a globalized context, the role of states is 
still important but not sufficient. Supranational organizations are better suited 
for this role than states, which are no longer capable of regulating the global 
economy alone, as they did in the past. 
 
 
V. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE LEX MERCATORIA IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 
 
 
In the European context, the prevalence of EU law and EU competence in 
trade matters show that the EU has become the main forum for the dialogue 
between law and market. In order to re-establish a public law dimension, an 
 
 
41 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], June 30, 2009, 2 BvE 2/08, 
http://www.bverfg.de/e/es20090630_2bve000208en.html. 
42 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], July 6, 2010, 2 BvR 2661/06, 
http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20100706_2bvr266106en.html.   
43 Corte Const., 22 ottobre 2014, n. 238, G.U. 2014, I,  45, 1 (It.). See also, Sentenza n. 238 anno 
2014, CONSULTA ONLINE, http://www.giurcost.org/decisioni/2014/0238s-14.html (last visited Apr. 2, 
2018) (providing numerous comments on the judgment). 
44 Adele Anzon Demming, Principio Democratico e Controllo di Costituzionalità sull’integrazione 
Europea nella “Sentenza Lissabon” del Tribunale Costituzionale Federale Tedesco, 2009 
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equilibrium needs to be found at the EU level between the rule of law and free 
markets (thus far guaranteed by the state).  
This conclusion is even more important if we consider the peculiarities of 
the EU market compared to the global market, as emerges from Article 3, 
paragraph 3 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU): 
 
The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for 
the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced 
economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive 
social market economy, aiming at full employment and social 
progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of 
the quality of the environment.45    
 
On the one hand, the European legal system is progressively oriented to 
achieving a balance between economic freedoms and other rights and public 
interests;46 on the other hand, it leaves Member States the opportunity to balance 
interests and to limit “economic freedoms in the name of public interests, social 
values and other fundamental rights.”47. 
It is meaningful that Article 3, paragraph 3 of the TEU mentions the social 
market economy which refers to a model of economic theory developed in 
Germany by the Freiburg school, according to that model the needs of the market 
“must be balanced and integrated with those of social policy,” although the 
context is that of a "strongly competitive” market economy.48  
The Lisbon Treaty49 has also strengthened the EU's role and competences 
in international trade and limited the action of Member States, which lose the 
power to undertake unilateral initiatives outside the common framework50—
even if limits on the exercise of competence in the area of common commercial 
policy are confirmed, such as in the reference to the principle of allocation in 




45 Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European Union, art. 3, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C. 
326) 17 [hereinafter TEU]. 
46 D’ALBERTI, supra note 2, at 110,  125, 145, 116, 133 (underlying the disproportion of the law of 
the global economy compared to the EU which allows for a balance of interests).  
47 Id. at 119 (showing some examples of limitations to competition rules).  
48  L. Fumagalli, Art. 3 TUE, in TRATTATI DELL’UNIONE EUROPEA 15, 18 (Antonio Tizzano ed., 
2014). See Karl Peter  Sommermann, Article 3: The Objectives of the European Union, in THE TREATY 
ON EUROPEAN UNION (TEU): A COMMENTARY 157, 172–73 (Herman-Josef Blanke & Stelio Mangiameli 
eds., 2013) (providing an analysis of the expression “social market economy”).  
49 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1. 
50 See G. CONTALDI, Art. 206 TFUE, in TRATTATI DELL’UNIONE EUROPEA, supra note 48, at 1701, 
1704; Alessandra Mignolli, La Politica Commerciale Comune, in L’ORDINAMENTO EUROPEO: LE 
POLITICHE DELL’UNIONE 133, 179 (Stelio Mangiameli ed., 2008).  
51 TFEU, supra note 38 art. 207, ¶ 6 (“The exercise of the competences conferred by this Article in 
the field of common commercial policy shall not affect the delimitation of competences between the 
Union and the Member States, and shall not lead to the harmonisation of legislative or regulatory 
provisions of the Member States in so far as the Treaties exclude such harmonisation.”). See Andrea 
Caligiuri,  Art. 207 TFUE, in TRATTATI DELL’UNIONE EUROPEA, supra note 48, at 1706, 1706 (discussing 
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The role of the EU in the globalized context also appears in Article 21, 
paragraph 2 of the TEU:  
 
The Union shall define and pursue common policies and 
actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all 
fields of international relations, in order to . . . encourage the 
integration of all countries into the world economy, including 
through the progressive abolition of restrictions on 
international trade. . .52 
 
For these reasons, the relationship between political (or institutional) sources of 
law and spontaneous sources of law must be found at the EU level. Also in the 
EU the efficacy of spontaneous sources of law cannot be derived irrespective of 
an explicit or implicit evaluation by the EU through sources of law.  
The goal of creating a common market has prompted the need to harmonize, 
standardize, and unify the law of the various European countries, resulting in 
some advantages for member states’ regulation of globalization effects. Even 
though this was not the original aim of the European order,53 the creation of a 
single market has indirectly controlled and reduced spontaneous sources of law 
by market operators in a given geographic area.  
An examination of the European legal system through some significant 
indicators—the marginal role of spontaneous, customary, sources of law by EU 
law; European Court of Justice case law about the lex mercatoria;54 choice of 
law in European private international law;55 the consideration of customary law 
by the European private law proposals of the Principles of European Contract 
Law and the Common European Sales Law56—shows the attitude of the EU 
legislator toward sources of lex mercatoria. This attitude, while open in some 
cases—as indicated by references to transnational customary sources of law seen 
 
 
52 TEU, supra note 45, art. 21, ¶ 2(e). See also Stefan Oeter, Art. 21 TUE: The Principles and 
Objectives of the Union’s External Action, in THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION (TEU): A 
COMMENTARY, supra note 48, at 833, 861. 
53 The original purpose of the European integration process was the peaceful cooperation between 
states after the Second World War. See The History of the European Union, European Union, 
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history_en (last visited Apr. 23, 2018).  
54 See Case C-87/10, Electrosteel Europe SA v. Edil Centro SpA, 2011 E.C.R. I-04987 (recognizing 
the importance of ‘uses’ in international trade, the Court refers to the codified version of Incoterms for 
the interpretation of contractual legal relations governed by European law). This case demonstrates that 
EU law is permeable to the customs of international trade. However, it must be underlined that in the 
same decision, the Court implies that the “European Union legislature” can always exclude the application 
of commercial customs, or provide for their delimitation to specific issues. 
55 See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the Law Applicable 
to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), COM (2005) 650 final (Dec. 15, 2005) [hereinafter Rome I] 
(debating Regulation 593/2008 on the modification of “Article 3 – Freedom of choice,” the Commission 
remarked that “[t]o further boost the impact of the parties’ will, a key principle of the Convention, 
paragraph 2 authorises the parties to choose as the applicable law a non-State body of law. The form of 
words used would authorise the choice of the UNIDROIT principles, the Principles of European Contract 
Law or a possible future optional Community instrument, while excluding the lex mercatoria, which is 
not precise enough, or private codifications not adequately recognised by the international community.”). 
56 THE COMM’N ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PARTS 
I AND II. (Ole Lando, Hugh Beale eds., 1999); Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 








2018                  THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE MEMBER STATES, AND THE LEX MERCATORIA 13 
in the judgment of the European Court of Justice57—is more restrictive in others, 
as illustrated by the reaffirmation of the prevalence of other sources of European 
law, as in the debate on the Rome I Regulation.58  
These circumstances suggest that regulatory strategies are no longer the 
remit of states—which are unable to regulate or limit the phenomenon as they 
did in the past—but are produced by more complex entities that are now the 
main interlocutors of globalization.  
For these reasons, it is possible to conclude that in a global market, a 
stronger EU could help guarantee the rule of law in the European context; the 
EU can help recover and defend the ‘public dimension’ in a globalized context59 
by ensuring that the balancing of interests involves not only judicial bodies, but 
also includes legislative bodies that represent these interests.  
A guarantee-based approach of this type requires that the limits inherent in 
the EU order be solved: firstly, the limits inherent in the EU’s role in the global 
context, and its relationship with international actors, states, large corporations, 
and lobbies; secondly, the well-known limits related to the EU institutional 
structure and process: transparency of the EU decision-making process, 
democratic deficit and accountability.60  
Two recent important documents show that the EU is achieving awareness 
in this direction. First, in a 2016 opinion by the European Court of Justice, the 
Court stated that the provisions of the free trade agreement with Singapore 
relating to non-direct foreign investment and those relating to dispute settlement 
between investors and States do not fall within the exclusive competence of the 
EU, so that the agreement could not be concluded by the EU alone without the 
participation of the Member States; it can, as it stands, only be concluded by the 
EU and the Member States jointly.61  
In the second, in their “Reflection Paper on Harnessing Globalization,” the 
European Commission seems to discount the excessive use of dispute settlement 
through arbitration, noting that “[d]isputes should no longer be decided by 
arbitrators under the so-called Investor to State Dispute Settlement (ISDS). This 
is why the Commission has proposed a Multilateral Investment Court which 
 
 
57  See, e.g., Case C-87/10, Electrosteel Europe SA v. Edil Centro SpA, 2011 E.C.R. I-04987 
58 Rome I, supra note 55. 
59 See BECK, supra note 1, at 157, 189 (explaining that globalization does not determine the end of 
politics but opens a new era for it. The author’s analysis focuses on the importance of international 
cooperation, stating that there is no national way-out from the trap of globalization. An institution such 
as the European Union could restore the priority of politics, a stronger social and economic capability for 
cooperating States, under democratic control. A stronger and democratic European Union could use its 
power as the world's largest trading power to introduce effective reforms both internally and externally). 
See also ULRICH BECK, POTERE E CONTROPOTERE NELL’ETÀ GLOBALE 216, 323 (C. Sandrelli trans., 
2010) (examining the State’ strategies between renationalisation and transnationalization, as well as the 
change in the concept of the form of state and politics).  
60 See Giuliano Amato, Poteri e Sovranità nel Mondo Globale, ASSOCIAZIONE ITALIANA DEI 
COSTITUZIONALISTI, 
http://www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it/download/jb5kPXP4zinecEqMjPk9qB0umYRDCtO2gD1
LlUOeL-c/relazione-amato.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2018) (discussing the different paths that can be 
followed in order to control the powers acting in the global arena, which may merge into a supranational 
governance framework organized according to democratic rules). 
61 Case C-2/15, Request for an Opinion pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU — Conclusion of the Free 
Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore — Allocation of 
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would create a fair and transparent mechanism and is being discussed with our 
partners.”62   
The Commission underlines the important role of the EU on the global 
scene, and its intention to manage globalization, noting that “outside the EU, an 
effective European economic diplomacy will help write the global rulebook and 
ensure that European companies can prosper in fast-growing international 
markets,” and that the EU has “the opportunity to shape globalization in line 
with [their] own values and interests.”63 These objectives require a revision of 
the European structure and strong cooperation between the EU and Member 
States. Recognizing the continued role of states in the global market, the 
Commission concludes that “harnessing globalization therefore starts at home” 
and that “EU institutions cannot do this alone: this must be a joint endeavor of 






62  See Reflection Paper on Harnessing Globalisation COM (2017) 240 final (May, 10, 2017) 
(footnotes omited).  
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
